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ABSTRACT
Over one hundred and thirty-five years ago the U.S. Supreme Court, in Gorham v. White, laid
down the test for design patent infringement called the "ordinary observer" test-one that is
administered through the eyes of men generally. It has remained the test ever since.
Recently, in Arminak &Assoc., Inc. v. SaintGobain Calmar, Inc and Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v.
Swisa, Inc., the Federal Circuit has improperly replaced this "ordinary observer" test with an
"extra-ordinaryobserver" test-one that uses persons who are versed in the trade. In order to
bring design patent jurisprudence in line with the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence in
Gorham, the Federal Circuit should restore the "ordinary" requirement in the "ordinary
observer" test.
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INTRODUCTION
Over one hundred and thirty-five years ago, the United States Supreme Court
laid down the test for design patent infringement in Gorham v. White.1 Ever since,
the Gorham test has been the bedrock of design patent jurisprudence; neither the
Court nor Congress has modified, or even addressed the test.2 The Gorham Court
held that the test for design patent infringement, which compares the overall
appearance of the patented design with that of the accused design, is to be judged
through the "eyes of men generally" and "ordinary observers," and not through the
eyes of a "persons versed in ...the trade."3 Graphically, the decision of Gorham can
be depicted as follows:
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1 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1872).
2 See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(applying the Gorham test to the 2008 decision), cert. denied, 77 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2009)
(No. 08-1031). In Egyptian Goddess, the Appellee argued that the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674 (1893) augmented the Gorham Court's ordinary
observer test with a separate and distinct "point of novelty" inquiry. Id. at 672. The en bane court
rejected this argument stating '[a] close reading of Whitman Saddle and subsequent authorities
indicates that the Supreme Court did not adopt a separate point of novelty test for design patent
infringement cases." Id. The on bane court concluded that "the 'ordinary observer' test should be
the sole test for determining whether a design patent has been infringed." Id. at 678.
3 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527-28.
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The Court reasoned that a test based on the observations of "persons versed
in... the trade" would "destroy all the protection, which the act of Congress intended
to give." 4 This is because persons versed in the trade can readily discern subtle and
inconsequential variations or differences between similarly-designed products.5 As a
result, these "extra-ordinaryobservers" will rarely, if ever, be deceived by similarlydesigned products, making it virtually impossible for a design patent holder to prove
design patent infringement. 6 Indeed, under an "extra-ordinary observer" test, the
only cases in which infringement would be found are those in which the infringing
party sold an exact replica of the patented design. 7 This is not the result intended by
the Gorham Court when it established the "ordinary observer" test, or by Congress
when it passed the Patent Act. 8
Two recent Federal Circuit opinions, Arminak & Assoc., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain
Calmar, Inc.9 and Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,10 appear to have placed
design patent jurisprudence at odds with Gorham and in a perilous state. Both
Arminak and Egyptian Goddess wrongly replace the "ordinary observer" test with an
"extra-ordinary observer" test.11

4Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.

7Id. at 529-30.
8 Soo id.at 524 ("The acts of Congress which authorize the grant of patents for designs were
plainly intended to given encouragement to the decorative arts."). "The law manifestly contemplates
that giving certain new and original appearances to a manufactured article may enhance its salable
value, may enlarge the demand for it, and may be a meritorious service to the public." Id. at 525.
9 501 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008).
10543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en bane), eart, denied, 77 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2009)
(No. 08-1031).

11See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 676; Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1324.
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In Arminak, the Federal Circuit rejected a design patent infringement test
based on the "eyes of men generally,"12 and instead created a test that relies on the
perceptions of "persons in the trade," namely, industrial buyers (also known as
organization buyers).13 Graphically, the Arminak holding can be depicted as follows:

Ordinary Observer
Arim i i ak
Ma1atin1c-e

Not Ordinary Observer
Retail
Store

hidustrial BSuyer/
Assembler

Retail
Coinsumrer

Figure2
The Arminak holding, by using the perceptions of industrial buyers to determine
infringement, is in direct conflict with the Court's holding in Gorham. Gorham
expressly prohibits the use of the perceptions of "persons versed in the trade" for
making design patent infringement determinations. 14 Simply put, industrial buyers
are "persons versed in the trade. 15 They are trained professionals whose jobs depend
on their ability to discern minor differences between products; rarely, if ever, will
they be deceived by a design other than an exact copy. 16 In a word, the perceptions of
industrial buyers are anything but "ordinary."
Shortly after its holding in Arminak, the Federal Circuit, in its en bane decision
in Egyptian Goddess, set forth a design patent infringement test that tacitly

Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1323.
Id. at 1324.
14 See Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527-28. The prohibited use of the personal perceptions of "persons
versed in the trade" is very different from the permitted use of the observations of persons "versed in
the trade" regarding the perceptions of ordinary observers. See id. In other words, whereas
observations of a retail salesperson regarding the perceptions of ordinary purchasers could be
permitted, the personal perceptions of a retail salesperson regarding the similarity/dissimilarity of
an accused and patented design should not. Id.
At the end of the day, however, and as
recommended in Part IV, the design patent infringement analysis should be left to the ladies and
gentlemen in the jury box with their everyday sensibilities and perceptions. In a bench trial, the
judge, sitting as the fact-finder, is said to share the ordinary sensibilities of an ordinary juror.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979) (holding that the court acts as the fact-finder in cases
where a jury has not been demanded).
15See A rminak, 501 F.3d at 1323 (describing the business of purchasing and assembling
component parts of a sprayer device and that an industrial buyer is a part of that business).
16 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527.
12

13
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approves an "extra-ordinary observer test."17 Specifically, Egyptian Goddess states
that the "ordinary observer" is one who is "aware of the great number of closely
similar prior art designs" and "conversant with the prior art."18 By defining the
observer as someone with such heightened knowledge of the prior art, the Egyptian
Goddess court effectively elevated the "ordinary observer" to an "extra-ordinary
observer," similar to its decision in Arminak. 19 This "extra-ordinary observer" is
precisely the class of individuals that Gorham cautioned against-"persons versed in
the design in the particular trade in question."0 While it is true that the freshlyminted Egyptian Goddess opinion contains several potential tests for design patent
infringement, if this "extra-ordinary-observer" test of Egyptian Goddess takes root, it
will create a test for design patent infringement that, like Arminak, will be on a
21
crash course with the Supreme Court's precedent in Gorham.
Yet, both Arminaks and Egyptian Goddess! tests for determining the identity of
the ordinary observer wrongly disqualify everyday observers, such as everyday
jurors, from serving as ordinary observers, placing them in conflict with Gorham.
Arminak reasons that these persons are disqualified from serving as ordinary
observers because they do not possess "the capability of making a reasonably
discerning decision" regarding infringement. 22 Similarly, Egyptian Goddess, with its
supra-intelligence requirement, disqualifies the average ordinary observer (of
ordinary intelligence) from serving as the arbiter of design patent infringement,
presumably because the court is skeptical that an ordinary observer can adequately
weigh the prior art when conducting the infringement analysis. 23 Everyday
observers, such as the average juror and the retail consumer, possess precisely the
everyday perceptions and sensibilities that Gorham sought to employ with its
"ordinary observer" test. 24
After all, jurors represent a cross-section of the
are "ordinary."25
nature
very
community and by their
In Part I of this article, I will discuss the "ordinary observer" test that the
Supreme Court laid down in Gorham. In Part II, I will discuss the holding of
Arminak and how it conflicts with Gorham. Next, in Part III, I will discuss the
holding of Egyptian Goddess and how it risks running afoul of Gorham depending on
how it is interpreted. Lastly, in Part VI, I will discuss a solution to the pitfalls of
Arminak and Egyptian Goddess that brings the test for design patent infringement
back in-line with Gorham.

17 See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 676. As explained herein, when commenting on the
potential conflict between Egyptian Goddess and Gorham, I am specifically referencing the portion
of the Egyptian Goddess opinion that I refer to herein as the "Extra-OrdinaryObserver Test." See
infra Part III.
18Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 676.
19 Id.
20 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528.
21 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 676.
22 Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain

Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
eart denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008).
23 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 676.
24 See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 527-28 (1872).
25 See New York v. McCray, 461 U.S. 961, 967 (1983) (affirming that the right to a jury
includes the right that the jury represents a fair cross-section of the community).
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I. GORHAMMANDATES THAT THE DESIGN PATENT INFRINGEMENT TEST IS TO BE
CONDUCTED THROUGH THE EYES OF ORDINARY OBSERVERS, NOT EXPERT OBSERVERS.
In Gorham v. White, the Supreme Court was confronted with the following
fundamental and crucial issue: Should the test for design patent infringement,
which compares the overall appearance of the patented design with that of the
accused design, be judged through the "eyes of persons versed in the trade" or
through the "eyes of men generally?" 26 In short, the Gorham Court decided that (1)
the eyes of men generally are to be used (i.e., ordinary observers),27 and (2) it is legal
error to use the eyes of persons versed in the trade.28
The design patent
infringement test that yields from the venerable Gorham holding is now commonly
referred to as the "ordinary observer test." A brief history of the lower court's
decision in Gorham helps elucidate not only the issue before the Court, but also the
Court's ultimate decision.
Gorham begins with Gorham Manufacturing Co. filing suit in the Circuit Court
for the Southern District of New York alleging infringement of its Design Patent No.
1,440 entitled "Spoon and Fork Handle."2 9 Gorham brought suit against George C.
White for White's handle designs on certain "spoons and other articles."30 In Figure 1
below, Gorham's patented handle design is on the left, and White's accused handle
design is on the right:

26Id. at 526-27.
27 Id.at

528.

d
2) Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 10 F. Cas. 827, 828 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 5,627) [hereinafter
Gorham Dist. Ct.], revd, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1872); see also Charles Spencer Curb & Cooper C.
Woodring, The Trial of the Century: Gorham Versus White, 1871, SILVER MAG., Jan./Feb. 2004.
28

30 Id.at

828.
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During the lower court proceedings in Gorham, the district court heard evidence
from both sides regarding the similarity of designs.3 2 The defendant White
submitted that the court should use the perceptions of persons versed in the trade for
purposes of making the infringement decision. 33 White argued that only persons
versed in the trade were qualified to make informed decisions on the relative
appearances of the accused and claimed designs. 34 Accordingly, White proffered
testimony from scores of "persons in the trade"-e.g., merchants, dealers, brokers,
designers, etc.-who testified that, in their opinion, the two designs were
substantially different. 35 These individuals pointed to several differences in the
accused and claimed designs.
The plaintiff Gorham, on the other hand, urged the lower court to use the
perceptions of the "ordinary observer" as the proper test for determining design
patent infringement. 36 Gorham argued that the accused design was intended to

Gorham, 81 U.S. at 522. As later will be discussed herein, the patents-in-suit in both
Arminak & Assocs. v.
Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008);
Gorham Dist. Ct., 10 F. Cas. at 828. Gorham's patent claimed a handle for a spoon or fork, while
Arminak's patent claims a sprayer shroud for a sprayer bottle. Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1318; Gorham
Dist. Ct., 10 F. Cas. at 828. Neither patent-in-suit sought coverage for an entire article of
manufacture.
32 See Gorham, 81 U.S. at 513, 518.
33
Id. at 530-31.
34 Id. at 518.
31 See

Arminak and Gorham only cover a portion of an article of manufacture.

35 Id.

36 Id. at 513.
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deceive the ordinary observer, not persons versed in the trade.3 7 After all, Gorham
pointed out, the ordinary observer would be the ultimate consumer of the spoons and
forks to which the ornamental handles were applied.3 8 If the ordinary observer was
deceived, Gorham argued, then the design patentee suffered an injury.3 9 In support
of its argument, Gorham introduced evidence showing that "ordinary observers"
would perceive the two designs as substantially similar, and thus, infringing. 40 The
testimony proffered by Gorham showed that ordinary observers would not be as
discerning as the persons versed in the trade, and would, in fact, mistake the accused
41
design for the patented design.
The lower court considered both arguments, and flatly rejected the ordinary
observer test: "It is impossible to assent to the view, that the test, in regard to a
patentfor a design, is the eye of an ordinaryobserver."42 Not only did the lower court

reject the ordinary observer test, but it also affirmatively held that design patent
infringement must be based on the perceptions of persons versed in the tradeeffectively an "extra-ordinary observer":
[T]hat test can only be ...substantial identity.., in view of the observation
of a person versed in designs in the particular trade in question-of a
person engaged in the manufacture or sale of articles containing such
designs-of a person accustomed to compare such designs one with another,
43
and who sees and examines the articles containing them side by side.
Applying this "extra-ordinaryobserver" test, the lower court found that the White
design did not infringe Gorham's design patent:
[Ciomparing the designs of White with the plaintiffs' design, it is
satisfactorily shown, by the clear weight of testimony, that the designs of
White are not substantially the same as the plaintiffs' design .... The

substance of the evidence of the most intelligent of them, persons in the
trade, is merely to the effect, that the White designs are not substantially
the same as the plaintiffs' design, but were intended to appear to be the
same to an ordinary purchaser, and will so appear to him, but that a person
in the trade will not be deceived, by the resemblance, into purchasing an
44
article of the one design for an article of the others.
Thus, despite the lower court's recognition that ordinary observers would be, in fact,
deceived, because persons versed in the trade would not, the court held that there
46
was no infringement. 45 Gorham appealed.
'37Id.

38 Id.

Id.at 528.
40 Id.at 513.
31

41 Id.
42 Gorham Dist. Ct., 10 F. Cas. 827, 830 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 5,627), rev'd, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 511 (1872) (emphasis added).
4 3 Id
44 I-d

45Id.
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The Supreme Court reviewed the matter and reversed the lower court, finding
that the design patent was infringed. In reaching its conclusion, the Court expressly
rejected the lower court's design patent infringement test and, of particular relevance
to this article, the lower court's reasoning. 47 Specifically, the Court stated:
The learned judge thought there could be no infringement unless there was
"substantial identity" "in view of the observation of a person versed in
designs in the particular trade in question-of a person engaged in the
manufacture or sale of articles containing such designs-of a person
accustomed to compare such designs one with another, and who sees and
examines the articles containing them side by side." There must, he
thought, be a comparison of the features which make up the two designs.
With this we cannot concur. Such a test would destroy all the protection
which the act of Congressintended to give. There never could be piracy of a
patented design, for human ingenuity has never yet produced a design, in
all its details, exactly like another, so like that an expert could not
distinguish them. No counterfeit bank note is so identical in appearance
with the true that an experienced artist cannot discern a difference. It is
said an engraver distinguishes impressions made by the same plate.
Experts, therefore, are not the persons to be deceived. Much less than that
which would be substantial identity in their eyes would be
undistinguishable in the eyes of men generally, of observers of ordinary
acuteness, bringing to the examination of the article upon which the design
has been placed that degree of observation which men of ordinary
4
intelligence give.

8

46 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 524.
47 Id. at 527-28.
48 Id. at 527 (emphasis added).

[8:354 2009]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

Thus, Gorham not only mandates whose perceptions are employed for determining
design patent infringement--i.e., "ordinary observers"-but it also mandates whose
49
perceptions should not be employed-l.e., "persons versed in the trade."
Graphically, Gorham can be depicted as follows:
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A first holding from Gorham is the oft-cited portion of the opinion that is now
commonly known as the "ordinary observer" test:
[in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser
usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is
such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one
supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the
other.50
The Court elaborated on its definition of "ordinary observers" holding them to be:
* "observers of ordinary acuteness"Fi'
* "men of ordinary intelligence,"52 and
* "men generally.",3
A second holding of the opinion, while cited much less often, is equally important.
Specifically, the Court expressly disqualified the observations of the following

49Id at 527-28.

5oId. at 528 (emphasis added).
51Id.
52Jd
o53Id.
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trade" for purposes

of making

design

patent

infringement

a person versed in designs in the particular trade in question" 54 ;
a person engaged in the manufacture or sale of articles containing such
designs" 55 ; and
a person accustomed to compare such designs one with another, and
56
who sees and examines the articles containing them side by side."

Simply put, "persons versed in the trade" are not ordinaryobservers, but instead, are
57
defined by the Court as "experts," and thus, extra-ordinaryobservers.
In sum, Gorham includes, at least, two fundamental holdings: (1) design patent
infringement determinations must be based on the perceptions of "the eyes of men
58
generally," "observers of ordinary acuteness" and "men of ordinary intelligence"
(i.e., "ordinary observers"), and (2) design patent infringement determinations must
not be based on the perceptions of persons versed in the trade 59 (i.e., "experts"). As
the Gorham Court made clear, these principles must be adhered to in order to
provide meaningful protection to design patentees.30 As discussed herein, however,
in its recent opinions in Arminak and Egyptian Goddess, it appears that the Federal
Circuit has strayed from these fundamental holdings.

II. ARMINAK'S SELECTION OF AN INDUSTRIAL BUYER AS THE "ORDINARY OBSERVER"
VIOLATES GORHAM
The facts of Arminak can be fairly stated as follows: a Manufacturer creates and
combines Product A and Product B yielding Product AB, which is then sold by the
Manufacturer to an Industrial Buyer who, in turn, assembles Product AB with
Product C.61 The resulting finished Product ABC is, in turn, sold by the Industrial
Buyer to a Retailer, who then sells finished Product ABC to a Consumer.6 2 Applying
this general framework to the specific facts in Arminak, Product A is a patented
sprayer shroud, which is part of a trigger sprayer device; Product B comprises the
63
other parts of a trigger sprayer device, including the nozzle, trigger and tube.
Product C is a labeled bottle with liquid (e.g., glass cleaner).64 Thus, finished Product
ABC (e.g., a bottle of Windex® glass cleaner) is assembled and sold by an Industrial
Buyer (e.g., Procter & Gamble) to a retailer (e.g., Wal-Mart) who resells it to a

54 Id.
5

d.

56 Id.
57 Id.

Id. at 527.
5 Id. at 528.
(30Id. at 527.
(31See Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008).
58

G2 Jd
(3
(4

Id. at 1318, 1320.
Id. at 1318.
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Analyzing the issue of infringement, the Arminak court sought to determine who
should be the ordinary observer: the Industrial Buyer who purchased Product AB, or
the Retail Consumer who purchased Product ABC.66 The Arminak court concluded
67
that the ordinary observer was the Industrial Buyer, and not the Retail Consumer.
Graphically, the Arminak court's holding can be depicted as follows:
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65 Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 424 F. Supp.2d 1188, 1190 (S.D. Cal.
2006) [hereinafter Arminak Dist. Ct.], affd, 501 F.3d. 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
2906 (2008).
66 Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1322.
67 Id. at 1324.
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In general terms, the Arminak court reached the same erroneous conclusion as the
lower court in Gorham.68 Just as the lower court in Gorham judged the ordinary
observer to be "casual, heedless and unintelligent,"(3 and thus not the proper arbiter
of design patent infringement, the Arminak court determined that the retail
consumer lacked the "capability of making a reasonably discerning decision when
observing the accused item's design whether the accused item is substantially the
same as the item claimed in the design patent."70 Both courts erroneously rejectedand seemingly mistrusted-the perceptions of ordinary persons, in exchange for the
71
perceptions of "persons versed in the trade."
While it is true that Arminak acknowledged Gorham's prohibition on the use of
the observations of "persons versed in the trade" for design patent infringement
determinations, it never answered, or even addressed, whether the Industrial Buyer
was, in fact, a "person versed in the trade."7 2 As explained below, Industrial Buyers
fall into not just one, but all three, of the very classes of persons that Gorham
expressly prohibited from the design patent infringement determination:
73
1) "person[s] versed in designs in the particular trade in question"
* An Industrial Buyer inspects and analyzes a wide range of
products incorporating the accused design during the course of
74
making purchasing decisions.

2) "person[s] engaged in the manufacture or sale of articles containing such
designs"
"

75

Industrial Buyer is engaged in the sale of the products
incorporating the accused design as they negotiate price and
quantity.

"

76

An IndustrialBuyer purchases products incorporating the accused
design with full knowledge of the manufacturing and assembly
77
processes into which such designs will be integrated.

3) "person[s] accustomed to comparing such designs one with another, and
78
who sees and examines the articles containing them side by side"
* An Industrial Buyer inspects and analyzes a wide range of
products incorporating the accused design, comparing such
79
designs with another while making purchasing decisions.
(38Compare Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 527 (1872) (rejecting the lower court's
holding that the "ordinary observer" is the "person versed in the trade"), with Arminak, 501 F.3d at
1324 (holding that the "ordinary observer" is the industrial buyer).
(3 See Gorham Dist Ct., 10 F. Cas 827, 830 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 5,627), rev'd, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 511 (1872).
70 Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1323.
71 See Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527; Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1323.
2 Id. at 1321-22.
73 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527.
74 See Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1323.
75Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527.
76 See, e.g., Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 117 n.1 (1974).
77See Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1323.
78 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527.
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Simply put, the Industrial Buyer are precisely the "persons versed in the trade" that
80
Goorham precludes from serving as ordinary observers.
At first blush, one might attempt to defend the Arminak selection of the
ordinary observer on the premise that the Industrial Buyer was the only purchaser of
the patented item.8 1 In other words, the parties downstream from the Industrial
Buyer do not qualify as the ordinary purchaser because they did not purchase "the"
patented item in isolation; rather they purchased the patented item in combination
with other non-patented components.8 2 Indeed, the district court in Arminak used
this argument to support its selection of the Industrial Buyer, which the Federal
Circuit ultimately withheld.83 Not only is this argument irrelevant (as explained
herein), but it is also based upon a false understanding of the "patented item" in
Arminak.
A close look at Arminak's facts reveals that no one actually purchased the
patented item in isolation, not even the Industrial Buyer. In the patent-in-suit,
Calmar's U.S. Pat. No. D381,581("'581 patent"), both the title and the claim are
directed to a "Sprayer Shroud."8 4 As shown below in the '581 patent's drawings, the
sprayer shroud is the only portion of the trigger sprayer device shown in solid lines. 85

Solid lines
(Claimed)

o

5

I

IW

flSI

Dotted lines
(Unclaimed)
Figure 786

See Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1323.
See Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527; Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1323.
81 Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1323.
82 Id. at 1324.
8
Arminak Dist. Ct, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ("Although an end user
necessarily obtains the shrouds when she buys the complete household product, she is not the
'ordinary observer" because she purchases a product into which the patented item is incorporated."),
afPd,501 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008).
84 Sprayer Shroud, U.S. Patent No. 381,581 (filed July 29, 1997).
79

80

85Id.
86Id (notations and commentary added).

[8:354 2009]

The New "Extra-Ordinary" Observer Test

Accordingly, the patented item in Arminak was only the sprayer shroud. The
other parts of the trigger sprayer device (e.g., nozzle, trigger, cap and tube) are all
depicted in dotted lines, and thus, form no part of the patented design.8 7 Neither the
Industrial Buyer, the Retailer, nor the Retail Consumer purchased the '581 "patented
item" in isolation.88 Rather, all parties in the stream of commerce purchased the
patented item in combination with other non-patented components.8 9 The Industrial
Buyer purchased the patented item (le., the shroud) in combination with nonpatented components (ie., nozzle, trigger, cap and tube)9 and the Retailer and Retail
Consumer purchased the patented item (le., the shroud) in combination with nonpatented components (i.e., nozzle, trigger, cap, tube, bottle and fluid).91 Thus, it
cannot be said that the Industrial Buyer is the ordinary observer because it is the
92
only party in the stream of commerce that purchased the patented item in isolation.
93
Under the facts of Arminak, no one purchased the patented item in isolation.
Not only should the determination of the "ordinary observer" not hinge on who
buys the patented item in "isolation," but it also should not hinge on who is the first
purchaser/user of the accused product, as suggested by the Federal Circuit in
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co.,94 a case Arminak relied
on.95 Such tests lead potentially to inconsistent infringement results depending on
who the patentee sues.9 (3 To illustrate this flaw, assume for the moment that the
patentee Calmar sued not only Arminak for its sales of the trigger sprayer
(incorporating the accused sprayer shroud), but also Wal-Mart for its sales of the
complete Windex® bottle (incorporating the same accused sprayed shroud). Under
this scenario, and when the ordinary observer is pegged off of who is the first
purchaser/user of the accused product, there are two separate "ordinary observers"
for determining infringement of the exact same patented item: (1) the ordinary
observer for the suit against Arminak would be the Industrial Buyer, and (2) the
ordinary observer for the suit against Wal-Mart would be the Retail Consumer'v
Simply put, such a conclusion is illogical and provides an unworkable framework for
fairly resolving design patent infringement suits(8

As explained in detail herein

(infra Section IV), attempts to precisely define a subclass of extraordinary observers
is not only in violation of Gorham and unnecessary, but it also leads to arbitrary and

inappropriate infringement findings.))

The most sensible approach is to leave the

87 Id; see also In re Zabn, 617 F.2d 261, 267 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (ratifying the use of dotted lines to
disclaim portions of the design); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1503.02 (8th ed., 7th rev, 2008) (discussing guidelines for
drawings submitted with design patents and specifically the use of "broken lines" in the drawings).
88 See Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1318.
89 Id.
9

0ArminakDist. Ct., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2006), affd, 501 F.3d 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008).
91Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1318.
92 Id. at 1321.
93 Id.

162 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
9 Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1322.
96 Goodyear, 162 F.3d at 1117.
97 See Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1324; Goodyear, 162 F.3d 1117.
98 SeeArminak, 501 F.3d at 1324; Goodyea r, 162 F.3d 1117.
99 See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 527-28 (1872).
94
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question of design patent infringement to actual ordinary observers-the ladies and
gentleman of the jury. 100
As a matter of policy, the Arminak holding threatens the enforceability of the
majority of design patents.101 This is because an "extra-ordinaryobserver," such as

the Industrial Buyer who is well-versed in the trade, can readily discern subtle
variations or differences between similarly-designed products, even when the designs
deceive the ordinary purchaser. The following short example highlights the flaw in
the Arminak test. Assume that a plaintiff-patentee asserts that its design patent (on
the left) is infringed by the accused design (on the right), which is similar in all material
respects, save for one minor and inconsequential design difference (as noted).

Minor design

difference
,,l ......

Plaintiffs Patented
Guitar Body Design

Defendant's
Accused Design
Figure8

Like the asserted patents in Gorham and Arminak, the patented design does not claim
the entire product; it claims only the guitar body-a portion of a finished retail
product. 102 Also, the accused product is not a final retail product in that it does not
include strings, frets, tuning pegs, a bridge or electronics. As in Arminak, the industrial

100 Id.
101 Almost 30 years after In re Zahn, the majority of design patents now claim only a portion of
an article of manufacture. Specifically, applicants routinely only claim a portion of the article of
manufacture by using dotted lines to disclaim immaterial, unimportant, or simply unwanted aspects
of the design. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office records show that in the 1981-the year
immediately following the Zahn decision-only seven percent of the issued U.S. design patents
utilized dotted lines to disclaim portions of an article of manufacturer. In 2008, the number has
increased to over fifty percent. As a result of this trend, even if it were contained to only factual
situations where the patented item is but a component of a larger product, the Arminak decision
still has a very significant impact.
102 See Zahn, 617 F.2d at 267. A patentee is entitled to disclaim portions of its design by
depicting such portions in dotted lines. Id. Here, the neck of the guitar is shown in dotted lines in
the patent and thus form no part of the claimed design. Similarly, in Calmar's '381 patent, the
nozzle, trigger, cap, and tube form no part of the claimed design, as they, too, are depicted in dotted
lines. Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1325.
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buyer adds these components, yielding the finished retail product.10 3 Below is an
illustration of the stream of commerce in which the defendant's product travels,
beginning with the defendant's manufacturer of the accused product, and ending with
the retail consumer's ultimate purchase.

Defendant's Stream of Commerce
ACCusecfiusra
Mfie

1

F

FTRBuyeT1
Assemibler
1

Figure 9
Under Arminak, the ordinary observer would be the industrial buyer, and not the retail
consumer. 104

Not Ordinary
Observer

Ordinary
Observer

Figure 10

Using the trained faculties of the industrial buyer, an unjust finding of noninfringement most assuredly results. 105 While unnoticeable to the retail consumer,
103 See Arminak Dist. Ct., 424 F. Supp.2d 1188, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2006), affd, 501 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008).
104 Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1323-24 (finding an industrial purchaser of product components to be
the ordinary observer).
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the minor and inconsequential differences would be noticed by the industrial buyer,
and thus, mandating a finding of non-infringement. Yet, inasmuch as the retail
consumer is deceived, the "patentee is injured, and the advantage of a market which
the patent was granted to secure is destroyed."106 Arminak completely ignores this
injury to the patentee. 10 7 As a result, under such scenario, design patentees are left
108
without effective means to protect their patented designs in the marketplace.
Under Arminak, the only cases in which infringement would be found are those in
which the infringing party sold an exact replica of the patented design. This is not
the result intended by the Court when it established the "ordinary observer" test, or
by Congress when it passed the Patent Act.

III. EGYPTIAN GODDESS'ELEVATION OF THE ORDINARY OBSERVER TO ONE VERSED IN
THE PRIOR ART RISKS RUNNING AFOUL OF GORHAM V WHITE

Shortly after the holding in Arminak, the en bane Federal Circuit again used
language in its decision in Egyptian Goddess that tacitly approved an "extra-ordinary
observer test."10 9 Specifically, Egyptian Goddess stated that the "ordinary observer"
is one who is "aware of the great number of closely similar prior art designs" and
"conversant with the prior art."110
Prior to the en bane Egyptian Goddess decision, a finding of design patent
infringement required the satisfaction of two distinct tests, namely, the Gorham
"ordinary observer" test and the so-called "point of novelty" test."'
Given the
considerable confusion regarding the latter test, the en bane Federal Circuit, in its
order granting rehearing, bluntly asked whether the point of novelty test should be part
of the design patent infringement test any longer. 112 Ultimately, the en bane court
scrapped the point of novelty test. 113 To fill the void left by the abrogated test, and
thereby address the "false positive infringement issue," the court defined the ordinary
observer as someone with heightened intelligence and knowledge of the prior art.114
115
By doing so, however, the decision risks running afoul of Gorham.
105 Id. at 1324 ("The record establishes that the ordinary observer would not be deceived by the
similarities between Arminak's AA Trigger shroud and Calmar's patented sprayer shroud.").
10(6Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1872).
107 Seo Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1323 (focusing only on the industrial purchaser as the ordinary
observer).
108 See id. at 1317, 1323-24 (stating that an industrial buyer, not the retail consumer is the
ordinary observer, and thus, affirming non-infringement of the patented article because such an
observer would not be deceived by similarities in design).
109 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 677-78, 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc),
cert. denied,77 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2009) (No. 08-1031).
110 Id. at 676, 678.
111 See, e.g., Contessa Food Prods. Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 282 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("Comparison to the accused product includes two distinct tests, both of which must be satisfied in
order to find infringement: (a) the 'ordinary observer' test, and (b) the 'point of novelty test."').
112 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 669.
113 Id. at 678.
114

Id.

115 Compare id.

(stating that the "ordinary observer" is "aware of the great number of closely

similar prior art designs" and "conversant with the prior art"), with Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527-28
(holding that the "ordinary observer" is the person of "ordinary intelligence").
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To understand the en bane court's predicament and its attempted solution to the
"false positive infringement issue, a brief history of the abrogated point of novelty
test is informative.11 The primary and original purpose of the point of novelty test
was to take into account the prior art in the design patent infringement analysis.117

Specifically, the point of novelty test aimed to prevent findings of infringement where
the accused design was substantially similar to both the claimed design and the prior
art ("false positive infringement issue").118

Stated another way, it prevented findings

of infringement where the accused design was merely "practicing the prior art."119
For example, consider the following situation wherein a Claimed Design is on the left
and an accused design on the right:

Claimed Design

Accused Design

Figure 11
Simply applying the ordinary observer test in a vaeuum-Le., not taking into account
the prior art-a fact-finder might reasonably conclude that the overall visual
appearances of the Claimed and Accused Designs are "substantially similar," and thus,
find infringement12 0 But what if the Accused Design was merely practicing the Prior
Art, as shown below?

116 For a more in-depth analysis of the issues with the "point of novelty" test see the briefs, at
both the petition and en bane phases, of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n in
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 437 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1253), and also, the
briefs of Apple, Inc., and Nike, Inc., as Amiei Curiae, and the Intellectual Property Owners
Association, which provides excellent analysis of the history and maladies of the point of novelty
test. Lastly, see Professor Crouch's blog entitled "An Ugly Stepsister: CAFC Accepts En Bane
Design Patent Case" at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/09/en-banc-federal.html.
117 See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[E]ven
though the court compares two items through the eyes of the ordinary observer, it must
nevertheless, to find infringement, attribute their similarity to the novelty which distinguishes the
patented device from the prior art.").
118 Soo

id.

119

See id.

120

Soo Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 670 (describing the Gorham ordinary observer test,

which gives rise to infringement when the designs are substantially the same in general appearance
and effect).
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Prior Art Design

Accused Design

Claimed Design

Figure 12
In order to ensure that the perceived similarity was not based upon gross
similarities between the Accused Design and the Prior Art, the point of novelty test
analyzed the relationship between the Claimed Design and the Prior Art Design. 12 1
Specifically, the point of novelty test sought to identify the difference(s) between the
Claimed Design and the Prior Art-i.e., looking backward. 122

Prior Art Design

Claimed Design

Figure 13
In this example, when comparing the Claimed Design to the Prior Art Design, the point
of novelty over the prior art would be the red heart in the upper right-hand corner.

121 See, e.g., Winner Int'l Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp., 905 F.2d 375, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ('[T]he
purpose of the 'point of novelty' approach... is to focus on those aspects of a design which render
the design different from prior art designs.").
122 Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444.
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Once identified, the point of novelty was then compared to the Accused Design to see if
123
it had been appropriated--ie., looking forward.

Claimed Design

Accused Design

Figure 14

Here, because the Accused Design did not incorporate the identified point of noveltyi.e., the red heart-there would be no infringement.12 4 Thus, in this example, the point
of novelty test successfully ferreted out the false positive finding of infringement that
125
resulted when the Prior Art Design was not taken into account.
While the point of novelty test addressed a legitimate concern ("the false positive
infringement issue"), in practice, the test proved unworkable and fatally flawed. In
particular, in situations where the claimed design had multiple points of novelty and
multiple prior art references were considered, there was no principled way to determine
the "correct" point of novelty. With the fact-finder forced to choose one, the design
patent infringement determination became arbitrary.
Not only was the test
unworkable, but a separate and distinct point of novelty test was also unneeded, as
shown below.

123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See id. (holding that the district court clearly erred in its determination of infringement
because it failed to consider the prior art).
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Claimed Design

Accused Design

Figure 15
When placed in this proper context, Gorham ordinary observer test yields the
appropriate finding of non-infringement without the need for the additional point of
novelty test. 126 Ultimately, the Egyptian Goddess court eliminated the "point of
novelty." 127 In its place, the Egyptian Goddess court implemented "a version of the
ordinary observer test in which the ordinary observer is deemed to view the
differences between the patented design and the accused product in the context of the
prior art."128 While the Federal Circuit should be applauded for eliminating the
troublesome "point of novelty" test, a test in which it itself created 25 years ago in the
wake of its momentous opinion, there is much confusion as to what now is the test for
design patent Jurisprudene. 9
Much of the confusion is because the Egyptian Goddess opinion appears to contain
several potential infringement tests that purport to take into account the prior art, with
little guidance as to which test to apply. It is uncertain at this time which test or tests
will take root. For purposes of this article, I will refer to the possible tests as follows:
(1) Straight Gorham, (2) Contextual Test, (3) Sliding Scale Test, and (4) Extra-Ordinary
Observer Test.130 If the "Extra-Ordinary Observer Test," takes root, Egyptian Goddess
126 See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 676, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert.
dened,77 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2009) (No. 08-1031).
127Id.at 678.
128 Id.at 676 (emphasis added).
129 While it is not surprising that in the wake of a momentous opinion like Egyptian Goddess
that the law is in a state of flux, the opinion does not help the matter by failing to provide guidance
as to whether the various tests are intended as mere factors, separate tests, or, perhaps, even the
same test. Id.
130 Id. The Straight Gorham test looks only at the claimed design and the accused design. Under
this test, there is no analysis of the prior art, as was the case in Gorham (hence the test's name "Straight
Gorham"). The Egyptian Goddess court endorsed the use of this two-way analysis when the claimed
design and the accused design are "sufficiently distinct." Id.at 678 (failing, however, to define the term
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will have improperly elevated the required knowledge base of the ordinary observer
to a level which violates Gorham.
Specifically, Egyptian Goddess' "Extra-Ordinary Observer Test" states that the
ordinary observer is one "who is conversant with the prior art" and "aware of the
great number of closely similar prior art designs." 131 Presumably, by defining the
ordinary observer in this fashion, Egyptian Goddess was attempting to confront the
false positive issue. In other words, an observer, with intimate knowledge of the prior
art, would not incorrectly find infringement where the accused design was merely
practicing the prior art. 132 Presumably, this observer knows what designs are new and
what designs are old (and can be copied). However, while the proposed definition
might resolve the false positive infringement issue, this language from Egyptian
Goddess runs afoul of the Supreme Court's precedent in Gorham. Simply put, the
observer who is one "conversant with the prior art" and "aware of the great number
of closely similar prior art designs" is not ordinary, they are extra-ordinary. As
discussed in Part I, infra, Gorham expressly prohibits the use of the perceptions of "a
person versed in designs in the particular trade in question."133 Egyptian Goddess
proposed ordinary observer, who is "aware of the great number of closely similar
prior art designs" and "conversant with the prior art," falls squarely within this
prohibited class of individuals. 134 As the Court stated in Gorham, relying on such
expert perceptions "will destroy all the protection which the act of Congress intended
to give."

13 5

"sufficiently distinct"). On its face, this approach does not run afoul of Gorham's prohibition against
using the perceptions of "experts," inasmuch as the test can be accomplished with the ordinary
sensibilities of the fact-finder. The next test is the Contextual Test which requires application of the
"ordinary observer" test "in view of the prior art." Id. at 676-78. In other words, the fact-finder
analyzes the accused design and claimed design for substantial similarity in view of the prior art.
Id. If this test is interpreted to mean that the fact-finder is provided the claimed design, the accused
design and the prior art, and then is asked to make a decision on infringement, this approach, on its
face, does not run afoul of Gorham's prohibition; the test can be accomplished with the ordinary
sensibilities of the fact-finder. The "Sliding Scale" test of Egyptian Goddess asks the fact-finder
whether the accused design is closer to the patented design than to the claimed design, then a
finding of infringement is found. Id. at 677-78. Caution, however, should be exercised in employing
the Sliding Scale test as both a test for, and defense against, infringement. If used as a test for
infringement, an accused design may be (wrongly) determined to infringe because it is closer to the
claimed design than to the prior art, despite the fact that an ordinary observer would not be
deceived into thinking the accused design was the claimed design. Egyptian Goddess presumably
advises that the Sliding Scale test should be only employed after it has been determined that the
two designs are not "sufficiently distinct" under the Straight Gorham test. While this filter provides
some comfort to this flaw with the Sliding Scale test, it is likely that the undefined "sufficiently
distinct" filter will not weed out all such situations and thus should be exercised with care.
131 Id. at 676-78.
132 Seo id. at 678 ("Where there are many examples of similar prior art designs ...differences
between the claimed and accused designs that might not be noticeable in the abstract can become
significant to the hypothetical ordinary observer who is conversant with the prior art." (emphasis
added)).
In this portion of the opinion, Egyptian Goddess defines the ordinary observer as
"hypothetical." Id. In other areas, it does not. In any event, the point stands that the court has
elevated improperly the knowledge base of the ordinary observer.
133 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 527 (1871).
134 Compare Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 676-78 (stating that the "ordinary observer" is
"aware of the great number of closely similar prior art designs" and "conversant with the prior art"),
with Go-rham, 81 U.S. at 527 (stating that the "ordinary observer" is one of ordinary intelligence).
135 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528.
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Indeed, the Gorham Court expressly cautioned against the use of individuals
with heightened intelligence and knowledge, such as those "versed in designs in the
particular trade" or those "accustomed to comparing such designs with another,"
when determining questions of design patent infringement:
Much less than that which would be substantial identity in their eyes would
be undistinguishable in the eyes of men generally, of observers of ordinary
acuteness, bringing to the examination of the article upon which the design
has been placed that degree of observation which men of ordinary
intelligence give ....
The purpose of the law must be effected if possible;
but, plainly, it cannot be if, while the general appearance of the design is
preserved, minor differences of detail in the manner in which the
appearance is produced, observable by experts, but not noticed by ordinary
observers, by those who buy and use, are sufficient to relieve an imitating
design from condemnation as an infringement. 136
Under the "extra-ordinary observer" test of Egyptian Goddess, which calls for an
observer having a heightened knowledge of the prior art, the enforceability of
virtually all design patents is threatened. Like the Industrial Buyer in Arminak, an
"extra-ordinary observer" is well-versed in the trade and can readily discern subtle
variations or differences between similarly-designed products, even when the designs
are intended to deceive the ordinary purchaser.13 7 As a result, the "extra-ordinary
138
observer" will only rarely, if ever, be deceived by similarly-designed products.
Here again, this is not the result intended by the Court when it established the
"ordinary observer" test, or by Congress when it passed the Patent Act. 139

IV. THE DESIGN PATENT INFRINGEMENT TEST SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE EVERYDAY
SENSIBILITIES OF THE FACT-FINDER

Arminak and Egyptian Goddess 14o take the determination of design patent
infringement out of the hands of every day observers and place it into the hands of
extra-ordinary observers.141 In both cases, the ordinary observer was apparently
disqualified because the court felt that the ordinary observer was not up to the task.
To avoid the pitfalls of Arminak and Egyptian Goddess and bring the design patent
infringement test back in line with Gorham, the solution is simple: The test should
1:36Id.

137 See id. at 527-28.
138 See id. at 527.
139

Id.

140 Again, here and elsewhere in the article, when I am criticizing the holding in Egyptian
Goddess, I am specifically addressing the Extra-Ordinary Observer Test, as described in Part III.
MI Compare Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527-28 (placing the determination of design patent
infringement in the hands of persons of ordinary intelligence, and not experts), with Arminak &
Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.Sd 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 2906 (2008) (placing the industrial buyer in the role of the ordinary observer), and Egyptian
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (finding that the ordinary
observer should be familiar with the prior art), eart. denied, 77 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2009)
(No. 08-1031).
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use the everyday sensibilities and perceptions of the ladies and gentlemen of the
142
jury.
In Arminak, the court felt that an everyday retail consumer was not "capable"
of making a reasonably discerning decision as to whether the shape of one sprayer
shroud was substantially similar to the shape of another sprayer shroud.143 In
Egyptian Goddess, under the Extra-Ordinary Observer Test, the court required an
observer who is "aware of a great number of closely similar prior art designs,"
because it was skeptical that an ordinary observer could properly take the prior art
finger nail buffers into account when conducting the ordinary observer test. As
discussed above, both Arminak and Egyptian Goddess violate Gorham. If the
ordinary observer is deemed unfit to render an informed decision on the shape of simple
and straight ahead product designs such as the sprayer shroud in Arminak and the
finger nail buffers in Egyptian Goddess, then it is highly unlikely that an average juror
will ever be considered capable of making a reasonably discerning decision regarding
design patent infringement.
To be sure, a group of jurors possess ordinary sensibilities to make reasoned
discernments regarding the relative appearances of items, including design on
sprayer bottles with trigger sprayer devices (Arminak), and finger nail buffers
(Egyptian Goddess). And if these ordinary observers are deceived, then the patentee
suffers an injury.1 44145There is simply no need to identify a specific subclass of
"ordinary observer." Rather, the "ordinary observer" is the juror, using his or her
everyday sensibilities and perceptions. 146 After all, jurors represent a cross-section of
the community and by their very nature are "ordinary" observers. 147 When Gorham
spoke of "ordinary" perceptions, it wisely chose the observations of "the eyes of men
1 48
generally," "observers of ordinary acuteness" and "men of ordinary intelligence.
In essence, the Court intended to give effect to the word "ordinary," which means "of
no exceptional kind, quality, or degree. 1 49
Given that most design patents are for designs applied to retail and consumer
products, everyday jurors are particularly equipped to assess the relative forms and
spatial relationships of the designs applied to such products.O0 Of course, industrial
designers design attractive products with these everyday observers in mind, not

142

As previously noted, in bench trial situations, the judge may properly serve as the fact

finder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979) (holding that the court acts as the fact-finder
in cases where a jury has not been demanded).
143 Arminak, 501 F.3d at 1322-23.
144
115

See id. at 1323.
Cf id. at 1321 ('A question that is central to this case, and every design case, is the identity

of the 'ordinary observer' of the design at issue ... .
146 See Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528.
117 See id. (stating that the ordinary observer is a purchaser of ordinary intelligence).
148 Id.
149 WEBSTER'S II, NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 771 (1995 ed.).
150 See Robert Kreuzbauer & Alan J. Malter, Embodied Cognition and New Product Design.*
ChangingProductForm to Influence Brand Categorization,22 J. OF PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 165,
165 (Mar. 2005); see also Nathan Crilly, James Moultrie, & P. John Clarkson, Seeing Things:
Consumer Response to the Visual Domain in Product Design, 25 DESIGN STUDIES 547, 547 (Nov.
2004); Christine Page & Paul M. Herr, An Investigation of the Processes by Which ProductDesign
and Brand Strength Interact to Determine Initial Affect and Quality Judgments, 12 J. OF
CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 133 (2002).
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middleman industrial buyers or extra-ordinary observers. While everyday jurors are
pre-qualified to assess the majority of designs, situations may arise where the
everyday juror, without more than their everyday sensibilities, is ill-equipped to
make determination on infringement. For example, there may be situations where
the designs in question are complex, such as a design for an intricate piece of
machinery, used in a highly technical field, such as aeronautical engineering. In this
situation, the everyday juror will likely need assistance and guidance from the
litigants' advocates (and the court) to properly understand the significance of the
prior art and the designs in question. However, a juror's lack of experience with the
subject is no reason to disqualify them.",' After all, in many areas of the law, jurors
are commonly educated before they execute their fact-finding function-e.g., utility
patent cases, criminal cases, securities law cases, products liability cases, etc.1' In
this regard, design patent infringement determinations are not unique.
The Federal Circuit, on occasion, has recognized that the ordinary observer is
the everyday juror sitting in the jury box. 153 In Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Ameria ,154 the Federal Circuit noted that:
Nothing in Gorham suggests that, in finding design patent infringement, a
trier of fact may not as a matter of law rely exclusively or primarily on a
visual comparison of the patented design.., and the accused device's
design. ... [in Gorham, the Supreme Court did not state, or suggest, that
a panel of jurors was anything other than a panel of ordinary observers
capable of making a factual determination as to whether they would be
deceived by an accused device's design similarity to a patented design.
Simply put, a jury, comprised of a sampling of ordinary observers, does not
necessarily require empirical evidence as to whether ordinary observers
155
would be deceived by an accused device's design.
The Braun court rightly concluded that the jurors themselves were ordinary
1 56
observers.
151 See WILLIAM H. DANNE, JR. ET AL., CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM JURIES § 291 (2008) ("In the
absence of a constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, a juror is not necessarily
disqualified because the juror is lacking in education.").
152 See John T. WOODALL, COMMONSENSE PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LITIGATION, 52 AM. JURIS.
TRIALS 1, § 73 (2008) ("[M]embers of the jury must be made to understand, in a relatively short

period of time, what it may have taken the lawyer months to learn.").
153 See Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
15 975 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, the accused product was a hand-held kitchen
blender. Id. at 818.
155 Id. at 821.
156See id.;see also Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 211 F. App'x 938, 941 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that the accused product was residential furniture, and also, rejecting
proffer of sales representative testimony for use in ordinary observer test while stating that "a panel
of jurors is a panel of ordinary observers capable of making factual determinations as to whether
they would be deceived"); Hosley Int'l Trading Corp. v. K Mart Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) (stating " Gorham does not prohibit a trier of fact from relying exclusively or primarily on a
visual comparison of the patented design and the accused device's design in finding design patent
infringement" (citing Braun, 975 F.2d at 821)); E. Am. Trio Prods. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp.
2d 395, 408 n.72 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Although the Gorham test is phrased in terms of consumer
confusion, a trier of fact may, as a matter of law, rely exclusively on a visual comparison of the
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Historically speaking, in the only case cited by Justice Strong in the Gorham
opinion, in Holdsworth v. M'Crea,157 the House of Lords, too, left the design patent
infringement decision to the everyday sensibilities of the jury. 158 In Holdsworth, the
House of Lords affirmed a jury determination of design patent infringement. 159 Lord
Westbury, affirming the jury's design patent infringement verdict, stated that:
"Whether, therefore, there be piracy or not is referred at once to an unerring judge,
namely, the eye, which takes the one figure and the other figure, and ascertains
whether they are or are not the same." 160

"[T]he appeal is to the eye, and the eye

alone is the judge of the identity of the two things." 161 Because the controlling
consideration was the effect on the eye, when viewing the two designs, the decision of
"whether there was any difference in the effect be left to the jury." 162 Accordingly, in
order to prove design patent infringement, a design patentee need only convince an
ordinary everyday jury, with everyday sensibilities and perceptions, that the accused
design is substantially similar to the claimed design.
Both Arminak and Egyptian Goddess cited the 1933 Sixth Circuit opinion in
Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metaleraft Corp.163

While Applied Arts does

suggest that the ordinary observer must have sufficient knowledge to make "reasonably
discerning infringement decisions,"164 Applied Arts does not provide support for the
position that "persons versed in the trade" should be the arbiter of design patent
infringement disputes, a position directly contrary to Gorhbam.165
Applied Arts holds that the fact-finder must have knowledge of, and thus
166
consider, the prior art when making design patent infringement determinations.
Applied Arts cautioned that, without knowledge of the prior art, the fact-finder may
improperly reach a finding of infringement when the accused infringer was merely
practicing the prior art (le., "false positive infringement issue").167 In essence, this is
the same issue raised in Egyptian Goddess. Simply put, the issue is resolved by
providing, and educating, the fact-finder with the relevant prior art during
deliberations on infringement. Arming the fact-finder with knowledge of the prior
art is very different from requiring that the ordinary observer be someone versed in the
designs of the trade in question. In short, Applied Arts merely acknowledges that the
ordinary observer test is not conducted in a vacuum, but rather in view of the prior
art.

patented design, the device that embodies the design, and the accused device's design, making
empirical evidence of confusion unnecessary.").
157 (1867) 2 L.R.E. & I. App. 380 (H.L.) (appeal taken from L.R. Exch.).
158 Id. at 381-82, 388. Holds worth has been recognized as the English court's seminal opinion
regarding design patent infringement. See Amp Inc. v. Utility Pty. Ltd., [1970] F.S.R. 162, 184
(A.C.).
'59 Holdsworth, 2 L.R.E. & I. App. at 384, 386, 389.
1(0 Id. at 388.
161 d.
162 M'Crea v. Holdsworth, (1870) 6 Ch. App. 418, 419-20 (A.C.).
1( 67 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1933).
164 Soo id.at 430.
165 See id.
166 d. at 429 C'[]t is clearly the rule that similitude of appearance is to be judged by the scope
of the patent in relation to the priorart." (emphasis added)).
1 7
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See id.at 429-30.
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Accordingly, in order to prove design patent infringement, a design patentee
should only need to convince an ordinary everyday jury, with everyday sensibilities
and perceptions, that the accused design is substantially similar to the claimed
design. These sensibilities and perceptions should be embraced and relied upon, not
excluded, like the Federal Circuit concluded in Arminak and Egyptian Goddess.

CONCLUSION

Over one hundred and thirty-five years ago the U.S. Supreme Court laid down
168
It
the "ordinary observer" test for design patent infringement in Gorham v. White.
169
has remained the test ever since.
The Federal Circuit's holdings in Arminak and
Egyptian Goddess improperly replace the ordinary observer test with an "extraordinary observer" test.170 In order to bring design patent jurisprudence in line with
the U.S. Supreme Court's in Gorham, the Federal Circuit should restore the
"ordinary" requirement in the "ordinary observer" test for design patent
infringement.171 It is only until then that designers will be provided with "the
protection which the act of Congressintended to give."172

168Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1872).
169See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 543 F.3d 665, 677 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) ("The
starting point for any discussion of the law of design patents is the Supreme Court's decision in
Gorham Co. v. Whit"), cert. denied, 77 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2009) (No. 08-1031).
As an aside, while it is directed not at infringement but at an "[a]dditional remedy for
infringement of design patent," 35 U.S.C. § 289 arguably sets forth a modified post-Gorham design
patent infringement test that supersedes the "ordinary observer" test. Specifically, § 289 reads:
Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1)
applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of
manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of
manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable
to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250, recoverable in any
United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties.
35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). Significantly, the statute makes no mention of an "ordinary observer." See
id. Rather, the statute speaks only in terms of an analysis of the "patented design" and an "article of
manufacture." Id. Indeed, on occasion, the Federal Circuit has used the language of § 289 to define
the design patent infringement test. See Arminak & Assocs. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d
1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The elements of design patent infringement are set forth at 35 U.S.C. §
289."), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008); see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire &
Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113, 1116-17 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Infringement of a design patent is the
unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of the article embodying the patented design or any
colorable imitation thereof'). A review of published opinions to date, however, shows that no court
has concluded that the language of § 289 supersedes the Court's ordinary observer test.
170 See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677 (using an ordinary observer familiar with the prior
art in the ordinary observer test); Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d
1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the ordinary observer is the purchaser of a retail product's
component parts), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008).
171 Until the Federal Circuit (or Supreme Court) has the opportunity to clarify these matters, it
is the hope of this author that district courts will: (1) curb the effect of Arminak by limiting the
holding to its specific facts; and (2) relegate those portions of Egyptian Goddess that elevate the
ordinary observer to an extra-ordinary observer as mere dicta.
172 Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527-28 (emphasis added).

